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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Dr. Richard Angelico appeals a summary judgment for 
the defendants, Lehigh Valley Hospital, St. Luke's Hospital 
of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Easton Hospital, the 
Panebianco-Yip Heart Surgeons, and Bethlehem 
Cardiothoracic Surgical Associates ("Bethlehem") 
(collectively, the "hospital defendants") on his antitrust 
claims. The District Court held that Angelico did not have 
standing to assert antitrust claims because he had not 
shown an injury to competition. We will reverse and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
Angelico also appeals the dismissal of his due process 
claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against Brian M. Peters, 
Esq., his law firm Post & Schell, P.C., and the firm's client, 
Lehigh Valley Hospital (collectively, the "attorney 
defendants"). Finally, he appeals the District Court's 
sanction in the form of attorney's fees for Peters. We will 
affirm the dismissal and attorney's fees award. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Angelico is a cardiothoracic surgeon. The three hospitals 
are located in the Lehigh Valley area in Pennsylvania. 
Panebianco-Yip and Bethlehem are physician practice 
groups specializing in thoracic and cardiothoracic surgery 
in the same area. Angelico began his career in the Lehigh 
Valley area with a group of cardiovascular specialists and 
became a member of the active medical staff of Lehigh 
Valley Hospital, where he performed cardiothoracic surgery. 
Just over a year later, Angelico left his original practice 
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group, joined Panebianco-Yip as that practice group's 
primary surgeon, and acquired active privileges at St. 
Luke's. 
 
In 1989, Angelico resigned from Panebianco-Yip and 
established his own practice. He maintained his privileges 
at both Lehigh Valley and St. Luke's until January of 1991, 
when he requested that his active privileges at Lehigh 
Valley be reduced to "courtesy" privileges, which allowed 
him to perform only a limited number of operations there 
each year. He maintained his courtesy privileges at Lehigh 
Valley until October 15, 1995. 
 
In March 1994, Angelico notified St. Luke's that he was 
resigning his staff privileges. He then attempted to apply for 
staff privileges at Easton. Easton, however, informed him 
that it had adopted a temporary moratorium on 
applications in its newly established heart program because 
it was considering whether to award an exclusive contract. 
Later, Easton informed Angelico that it had awarded an 
exclusive contract to another surgeon from outside of the 
region. 
 
Angelico asserts that he resigned from St. Luke's because 
the hospital willfully failed to provide him with competent 
surgical support and that he was therefore constructively 
terminated. He further contends that the hospital 
defendants had a sufficient share of the relevant market to 
control it and that they conspired to eliminate him as a 
competitor through "various predatory acts," including 
circulating defamatory remarks regarding his interpersonal 
and patient care skills. Angelico claims that his courtesy 
privileges at Lehigh Valley were improperly terminated as a 
part of this conspiracy and that he has now been 
"blackballed" by the three hospitals. 
 
Angelico sued the three hospitals and two practice 
groups, alleging that they had violated the Sherman Act by 
conspiring to eliminate him as a competitor. Specifically, he 
claims that the hospital defendants engaged in exclusive 
dealing and a group boycott in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, and that they control a 
dominant (monopoly) share of the market in violation of 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2. He seeks treble 
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damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15. 
Angelico also argues that the attorney defendants violated 
his constitutional rights through their use of the state 
subpoena process and that the District Court improperly 
assessed attorney's fees against him. 
 
The District Court dismissed Angelico's claims against 
the attorney defendants and granted the attorney 
defendants' motion for sanctions. See Angelico v. Lehigh 
Valley Hosp., Inc., No. Civ.A. 96-2861, 1996 WL 524112 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1996) ("Angelico I"). On Angelico's 
antitrust claims, the District Court granted a motion by the 
hospital defendants for limited discovery on the issues of 
antitrust standing and antitrust injury. Following discovery, 
the court granted the hospital defendants summary 
judgment on the antitrust claims, holding that Angelico had 
failed to establish standing to pursue them. See Angelico v. 
Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
("Angelico II"). 
 
The District Court noted that Angelico suffered significant 
lost income but held that "an injury to Dr. Angelico 
personally does not confer standing upon him without a 
showing that his absence from the relevant product and 
geographic markets injured competition and/or the 
consumers of cardiothoracic surgical services in these 
markets." Id. at 313. Focusing on the effect of Angelico's 
removal on the market, the court found "no evidence" that 
there were any fewer competing surgeons or that the 
quality of cardiothoracic care had been reduced by his 
absence, see id., and "insufficient evidence of a negative 
impact on price." Id. at 314. Based on these findings, the 
District Court concluded that Angelico had not "suffered 
the type of injury that the antitrust laws were designed to 
prevent . . . [or] that Dr. Angelico is the most efficient 
enforcer of those laws." Id. 
 
On appeal, Angelico argues that the District Court erred 
by: (1) holding that he failed to establish antitrust standing 
because he could not show an effect on the prices, quantity 
or quality in the relevant market; (2) failing to declare that 
the hospital defendants' acts were illegal "per se"; (3) 
holding that he failed to state a section 1983 claim upon 
which relief could be granted against the attorneys for 
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Lehigh Valley, and (4) imposing sanctions against him 
without holding a hearing. We have plenary review of the 
antitrust standing question, see McCarthy v. Recordex 
Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 847 (3d Cir. 1996), and of the 
summary judgment on Angelico's claims against the 
hospital defendants. See Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters 
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993). 
We review an assessment of attorney's fees for abuse of 
discretion if the court applied the correct legal standard. 
See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 387 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. The Antitrust claims 
 
In this case, we must distinguish the antitrust injury that 
is required for a plaintiff to have standing to bring an 
antitrust claim from the anticompetitive market effect 
element of a claim under section 1, which is also generally 
referred to as "antitrust injury." 
 
A. Antitrust Standing 
 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15, provides 
that "any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United 
States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, 
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 
Id. Antitrust standing, however, is narrower than the 
statute's wording indicates. See Associated Gen. Contractors 
of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters , 459 U.S. 
519, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983) ("AGC"); II Phillip E. Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application P 360, at 192 (rev. ed. 1995) 
("The limitations on antitrust standing are only hinted at by 
the simple and apparently broad language of S4 of the 
Clayton Act."). 
 
An antitrust injury is an " `injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes the defendants' acts unlawful.' " Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109, 107 S. Ct. 484, 489 (1986) 
(citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 
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477, 489, 97 S. Ct. 690, 697 (1977)); see also In re Lower 
Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1163 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1993) (standing analysis involves consideration of 
"the nexus between the antitrust violation and the 
plaintiff 's harm" and "whether the harm alleged is of the 
type for which Congress provides a remedy"). The focus is 
broader than the injury suffered by the potential plaintiff. 
Although a showing of antitrust injury is necessary, it is 
"not always sufficient[ ] to establish standing under 
[section] 4, because a party may have suffered antitrust 
injury but may not be a proper plaintiff under [section] 4 
for other reasons." Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110 n.5, 107 S. Ct. 
at 489 n.5. 
 
Drawing on AGC, we have stated the factors to be 
employed in a standing analysis under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act. These are: 
 
       (1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
       violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the intent by 
       the defendant to cause that harm, with neither factor 
       alone conferring standing; (2) whether the plaintiff 's 
       alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust laws 
       were intended to provide redress; (3) the directness of 
       the injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
       application of standing principles might produce 
       speculative claims; (4) the existence of more direct 
       victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and (5) the 
       potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
       apportionment of damages. 
 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron, 998 F.2d at 1165-66 (citing 
AGC, 459 U.S. at 545, 103 S. Ct. at 912). We hold that, 
applying these factors, Angelico has standing to challenge 
the alleged conspiracy, boycott and monopoly. 
 
First, because no discovery was allowed on the issue, we 
must assume Angelico's allegation that the defendants 
acted in concert and with an anticompetitive motive, i.e., 
conspired, is true. Following this assumption, Angelico's 
harm clearly resulted from the conspiracy that prevented 
him from competing in the market and thereby earning a 
living. At this stage, therefore, the causal 
connection/defendant intent element of the standing 
analysis is satisfied. 
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Turning to the second element, whether Angelico's 
alleged injury is of the type the antitrust laws were meant 
to redress, we conclude that the injury he suffered, when 
shut out of competition for anticompetitive reasons, is 
indeed among those the antitrust laws were designed to 
prevent. In Brader v. Allegheny General Hospital , 64 F.3d 
869 (3d Cir. 1995), a doctor sued a hospital and individual 
physicians, alleging similar claims under sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed the 
claims, and we reversed, holding that Brader, as a potential 
competitor shut out of a market by a purported group 
boycott, had alleged the type of injury protected by the 
antitrust laws. We stated: "the type of injury alleged by 
Brader (the loss of income due to an inability to practice in 
the relevant market area) is directly related to the illegal 
activity in which the defendant allegedly engaged: a 
conspiracy to exclude Brader from the relevant market." Id. 
at 877.1 Angelico, like Brader, alleges a concerted effort to 
exclude him from the market for cardiothoracic surgery and 
his injury flows directly from this action. See In re Lower 
Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1164 n. 14 ("Because the [plaintiffs] 
themselves were direct competitors of the [defendants] and 
because they were injured by the conspiracy's goal to 
preclude them from market entry, no standing problem is 
posed by their quest for damages."); Fuentes v. South Hills 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellees assert that only persons with the same interests as 
consumers have standing under the antitrust laws and cite Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977), in which the 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
       The antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of 
competition 
       not competitors . . . . The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive 
       effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made 
possible 
       by the violation. It should, in short, be the type of loss that the 
       claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause. 
 
429 U.S. 477, 488-89, 97 S. Ct. 690, 697 (internal quotes omitted) 
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the fact that the antitrust laws are 
intended to protect competition rather than competitors does not mean 
that a competitor is never a proper antitrust plaintiff. Indeed, 
protecting 
a competitor's ability to compete from a conspiracy, the sole purpose of 
which is to decrease competition by eliminating that competitor, is 
clearly in the interest of competition. 
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Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1991) (not 
addressing standing directly, but noting that similar 
allegations by a doctor were sufficient to state a claim and 
to avoid a motion to dismiss). 
 
Angelico also satisfies the third, fourth andfifth elements 
of the AGC standing analysis. The injury to Angelico from 
the assumed conspiracy is clearly direct (and substantial). 
Angelico's injury is the direct result of the alleged 
conspiracy. In contrast, the harm to consumers is less 
direct because it will only arise from higher costs or poorer 
treatment that result from the removal of a strong 
competitor from the market. A consumer would be highly 
unlikely to sue for a loss of this type. Finally, there is no 
potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment 
of damages, see, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977), because Angelico's injury has 
not been passed along to others. 
 
In sum, we hold that Angelico has standing. This is not 
a case, however, in which we grant standing to a competitor 
who was simply harmed by strong competition. Rather, 
Angelico has asserted facts indicating that he was harmed 
by a conspiracy with an illegal anticompetitive intent. He 
has standing because he has asserted an injury of "the type 
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent" flowing from 
"that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful." Cargill, 
479 U.S. at 109, 107 S. Ct. at 489. Because the District 
Court's determination was based on its premise that 
Angelico did not have standing, we must remand the cause.2 
 
B. Anticompetitive market effect 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, prohibits 
"contracts, combinations or conspiracies `in restraint of 
trade.' " City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court erred by incorporating the issue of anticompetitive 
market effect into its standing analysis, confusing antitrust injury with 
an element of a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1, 
which prohibits "contracts, combinations or conspiracies `in restraint of 
trade.' " The court's approach may have been the result of the similar 
"antitrust injury" label which is applied to the injury component of 
antitrust standing analysis and to the marketplace harm element under 
section 1. 
 
                                9 
  
256, 267 (3d Cir. 1998). To establish a section 1 claim 
under the rule of reason test,3 plaintiffs must prove, 
 
       (1) that the defendants contracted, combined, or 
       conspired among each other; (2) that the combination 
 953<!>or conspiracy produced adverse, anti-competitive 
 
       effects within relevant product and geographic 
       markets; (3) that the objects of and the conduct 
       pursuant to that contract or conspiracy were illegal; 
       and (4) that the plaintiffs were injured as a proximate 
       result of that conspiracy. 
 
Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 722 (citations omitted). The second 
element may be satisfied in two ways: 
 
       The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by proving the 
       existence of actual anticompetitive effects, such as 
       reduction of output, increase in price, or deterioration 
       in quality of goods and services. Due to the difficulty of 
       isolating the market effects of the challenged conduct, 
       however, such proof is often impossible to make. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We reject Angelico's assertion (citing Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)) that the hospital defendants' acts 
should be held illegal per se. Courts follow one of two lines of analysis 
to assess the validity of section 1 claims. See Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-47, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-74 (1982). The 
first, "rule of reason" analysis, applies in most cases under this 
section, 
while the second, "per se" analysis, applies only to "agreements whose 
nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no 
elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality." 
National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692, 98 S. 
Ct. 1355, 1365 (1978). 
 
Group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal are not always per se 
violations of the Sherman Act; rather, the analysis turns on the facial 
effects of the challenged practice. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 
Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 105 S. Ct. 2613 
(1985). Similar cases involving medical professionals have utilized the 
"rule of reason" analysis. See Betkerur v. Aulthman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 
1079, 1088-93 & n. 9 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing and rejecting 
application of per se analysis to a doctor's claims under section 1 and 
citing, in the footnote, Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th 
Cir.1992), and other cases holding that rule of reason analysis is 
normally applied to claims by physicians in the position of Angelico). We 
see no reason to depart from this approach. 
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       Accordingly, the courts allow proof of the defendant's 
       "market power" instead. Market power--the ability to 
       raise prices above those that would prevail in a 
       competitive market--is essentially a " `surrogate for 
       detrimental effects.' " 
 
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also VII Phillip E. Areeda, 
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application P 1511, at 429 (1986). 
 
Although the District Court considered Angelico's 
proffered evidence of an actual anticompetitive market 
effect, we will not address that evidence because it is 
appropriate that the District Court reconsider it within the 
legal framework we have outlined.4 This will give the court 
the opportunity to address Angelico's claim that he need 
not show actual anticompetitive market effect in this 
instance because of the Appellees' alleged market power.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note in this regard that Angelico's counsel conceded at oral 
argument that he did not need further discovery into the element of 
marketplace harm. 
 
We likewise decline the hospital defendants' suggestion that we affirm 
the District Court's holding on the ground that Angelico failed to 
properly define or prove the relevant product and geographic markets 
because the District Court did not address the issue. See Angelico II, 984 
F. Supp. at 313 (assuming for the purposes of the limited motion for 
summary judgment that the relevant product market was "cardiothoracic 
surgical services" and that the relevant geographic market was "the 
greater Lehigh Valley consisting of Carbon, Monroe, Lehigh, 
Northampton and Schuylkill Counties"). 
 
5. Moreover, a finding of no anticompetitive market effect would not 
suffice to dispose of Angelico's claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
See Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 939 (5th Cir. 1988) 
("[P]roving an injury to competition is not an element of a 
monopolization-based antitrust claim."). It is sufficient to note that it 
remains for the District Court to further assess these issues at the 
summary judgment stage. See Brader, 64 F.3d at 876 ("[T]he adequacy 
of a physician's contentions regarding the effect on competition is 
typically resolved after discovery, either on summary judgment or after 
trial."). 
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III. The section 1983 claim 
 
Angelico asserts that the District Court erred by holding 
that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted against the attorney defendants under section 
1983. This claim arises out of the litigation of a related 
state court suit that was resolved during the course of this 
litigation. Geoffrey Toonder, a cardiothoracic surgeon, sued 
Lehigh Valley Hospital, claiming that it improperly denied 
Toonder an "active manpower slot" that would have been 
filled by Angelico. See Toonder v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. 
Civ.A. 94-E-18 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas May 31, 1995) 
[the "Toonder litigation"]. Toonder was represented by the 
same attorneys who represent Angelico. Lehigh Valley, 
through its attorneys -- defendants Peters and hisfirm, 
Post & Schell, P.C. -- subpoenaed various members of St. 
Luke's staff, seeking information regarding Angelico's 
resignation from that hospital. Angelico claims that, 
through the use of the subpoenas, the attorney defendants 
violated his constitutionally protected property and liberty 
interests. The District Court dismissed these claims. See 
Angelico I, 1996 WL 524112. 
 
Under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, Angelico must show that the 
attorney defendants acted under the color of state law and 
denied him a federally protected constitutional or statutory 
right. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930, 
102 S. Ct. 2744, 2750 (1982); Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, 
O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Because Angelico sued private individuals for actions taken 
in their roles as attorneys, he must point to some action 
that is "fairly attributable" to the state. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 
937, 102 S. Ct. at 2753. To do this, Angelico must show (1) 
that the attorney defendants' acts were "the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of 
conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the 
State is responsible" and (2) that the attorney defendants 
may fairly be said to be state actors. Id. 
 
A person may be found to be a state actor when (1) he is 
a state official, (2) "he has acted together with or has 
obtained significant aid from state officials," or (3) his 
conduct is, by its nature, chargeable to the state. Id. at 
937, 102 S. Ct. at 2753-54. The Supreme Court noted that 
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"[w]ithout a limit such as this, private parties could face 
constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some 
state rule governing their interactions with the community 
surrounding them." Id. at 937, 102 S. Ct. at 2754. 
 
Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not 
be considered state actors solely on the basis of their 
position as officers of the court. See, e.g., Polk County v. 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S. Ct. 445, 450 (1981) ("[A] 
lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an 
officer of the court, a state actor `under color of state law' 
within the meaning of S 1983."); Barnard v. Young, 720 
F.3d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[P]rivate attorneys, by 
virtue of being officers of the court, do not act under color 
of state law within the meaning of section 1983."). Angelico 
asserts, however, that the attorneys acted as state officers 
in issuing the subpoenas because the "state subpoena 
procedures now empower the attorneys, as officers of the 
state, to use subpoenas to seize property without a hearing 
before a state court judge and without participation by the 
sheriff." Appellant's Br. at 44. Angelico, however, offers no 
authority to support this statement. Nor does Pennsylvania 
law provide any indication that attorneys have been granted 
elevated powers to use subpoenas.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure state: 
 
       (a) A subpoena is an order of the court commanding a person to 
       attend and testify at a particular time and place. It may also 
require 
       the person to produce documents or things which are under the 
       possession, custody or control of that person. 
 
       * * * 
 
       (b) A subpoena may be used to command a person to attend and to 
       produce documents or things only at 
 
        (1) a trial or hearing in an action or proceeding pending in the 
       court, or 
 
        (2) the taking of a deposition in an action or proceeding pending 
       in the court. 
 
       (c) A subpoena may not be used to compel a person to appear or to 
       produce documents or things ex parte before an attorney, a party or 
       a representative of the party. 
 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 234.1 (emphasis added). 
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As we said in Jordan, "[b]efore private persons can be 
considered state actors for purposes of section 1983, the 
state must significantly contribute to the constitutional 
deprivation, e.g., authorizing its own officers to invoke the 
force of law in aid of the private persons' request." 20 F.3d 
at 1266. Angelico claims that by issuing a subpoena, 
private attorneys use "the same compulsive powers of the 
state." Appellant's Br. at 45. We disagree. In Jordan, 
attorneys, on behalf of a client, entered a judgment by 
confession and then executed on that judgment. See id. at 
1264-67. We held that an "entry of the judgment is not a 
state action involving the force of law to an extent sufficient 
to hold that private persons become state actors." Id. at 
1266. Then, focusing on the role of the sheriff, a state 
official, in the execution of the judgment, we stated: 
 
       a private individual who enlists the compulsive powers 
       of the state to seize property by executing on a 
       judgment without pre-deprivation notice or hearing 
       acts under color of law and so may be held liable under 
       section 1983 if his acts cause a state official to use the 
       state's power of legal compulsion to deprive another of 
       property. 
 
Id. at 1267 (emphasis added). 
 
In dismissing Angelico's claim, the District Court properly 
applied Jordan by focusing on the distinction between the 
potential for state involvement and actual state 
involvement. 
 
       Although plaintiff notes that there are potential legal 
       consequences attached to failure to obey a subpoena 
       which might ultimately involve invoking the assistance 
       of state officials, such possibility serves only to 
       highlight the difference between resorting to an 
       available state procedure and actually using state 
       officials to enforce or carry out that procedure. The 
       potential for involving the coercive power of the state 
       likewise exists when a judgment by confession is 
       entered, yet . . . a private party is not converted into a 
       state actor as long as the assistance of state officials 
       remains merely a potential threat. It is only when, and 
       if, such potential is realized that a private party may be 
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       converted into a state actor for purposes of satisfying 
       the state action element of a S 1983 claim. 
 
Angelico I, 1996 WL 524112, at *2. The court's analysis is 
sound and consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in 
Lugar. We hold, therefore, that an attorney does not 
become a state actor simply by employing the state's 
subpoena laws. See Barnard, 720 F.3d at 1189 ("If an 
attorney does not become a state actor merely by virtue of 
instigating state court litigation, then the attorney does not 
become a state actor merely by employing state authorized 
subpoena power." (citations omitted)). Angelico's section 




In the same order in which it dismissed the section 1983 
claims, the District Court agreed to award sanctions to the 
attorney defendants in the form of attorney's fees. See 
Angelico I, 1996 WL 524112. In his complaint, Angelico 
stated his antitrust claims against "all defendants," thereby 
including the attorney defendants as defendants to the 
antitrust claims. Angelico declined to dismiss the charges 
against them despite their verbal request that he do so. 
Only after the attorney defendants filed their motion to 
dismiss, addressing the antitrust claims, did Angelico 
voluntarily dismiss these claims. Angelico's counsel then 
informed the attorney defendants that the antitrust claims 
had not been intentionally asserted against them. Following 
a motion for sanctions and the filing of an affidavit of costs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Because Angelico has not demonstrated that the attorney defendants 
were state actors, we need not address the balance of the section 1983 
analysis. We also reject Angelico's claim that his due process rights were 
violated by the attorney defendants' actions in regards to the subpoenas. 
Finally, we reject Angelico's allegation that the District Court engaged 
in 
improper fact finding. This allegation apparently refers to the District 
Court's understanding that no actual state officials were called upon to 
enforce the subpoenas in the Toonder litigation. However, the District 
Court was entitled to take judicial notice of the facts of that decision. 
See 
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1988); 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure S 1364, at 479 n.36 (2d ed. 1990). 
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by the defendants, a Motion to Vacate, Reconsider or 
Certify Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) by Angelico, and a 
response thereto by the attorney defendants, the District 
Court awarded $1,000 to attorney Peters for his costs in 
preparing to defend the withdrawn antitrust claims against 
him and his firm.8 
 
Awarding attorney's fees as a means of sanctioning a 
party is within the District Court's inherent power. See 
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 
2133 (1991). The District Court can assess attorney's fees 
when a party has acted in bad faith. See Chambers, 501 
U.S. at 45, 111 S. Ct. at 2133. Here the District Court 
found that Angelico and his attorneys acted in bad faith by 
failing to dismiss the antitrust claims against the attorney 
defendants, by mischaracterizing the defendants' pleadings, 
and by failing to inform the court of a significant change in 
the Toonder litigation (its dismissal). See Angelico v. Lehigh 
Valley Hosp., No. Civ.A.96-2861, Order (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 
1996). The District Court applied the correct legal standard 
to determine whether sanctions were in order and carefully 
stated the acts by Angelico's counsel upon which the order 
is based.9 
 
Although, "like other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly 
should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing on the record," Roadway Express, 
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 
(1980), we have not interpreted the "opportunity for a 
hearing on the record" discussed by the Supreme Court to 
require an evidentiary hearing in every case. See Rogal v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The original decision stated that the court would award "modest 
monetary sanctions" and required the attorney defendants to submit a 
record of their costs. Upon receiving the submissions, the District Court 
found that the costs were far greater than it had anticipated and elected 
to award only the $1,000. 
 
9. We reject Angelico's assertion that the attorney defendants should 
have realized that they were not subject to the antitrust claims because 
it implies that the nonfiling side should bear the burden of an allegedly 
inadvertent pleading mistake. The attorney defendants requested that 
the claims against them be dropped. The fact that the attorney 
defendants did not specifically address the antitrust claims does not 
serve as an escape hatch for the defendants. 
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American Broad. Cos., 74 F.3d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1996); see 
also G.J.B. & Assocs. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 830 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (while counsel generally deserve an opportunity 
to brief the issue, the imposition of sanctions does not 
necessarily mandate an oral or evidentiary hearing). Rather, 
the concept of due process is flexible and whether a hearing 
is required depends upon the circumstances. See Rogal, 74 
F.3d at 44. Application of this flexible standard is generally 
left to the District Court's discretion. See Jones v. 
Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1359 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(noting that this approach "permits some cases to be 
disposed of on the record"). 
 
Here, the District Court decided that further factfinding 
was unnecessary. Appellant had both fair notice of the 
charges and an opportunity to respond because the motion 
for sanctions was made along with attorney defendants' 
motion to dismiss. All of the acts by Angelico and his 
counsel that were at issue were part of the record and 
could be considered without an evidentiary hearing. We 




We conclude that the District Court did not err by 
dismissing the section 1983 claims against the attorney 
defendants, and that it was well within its considerable 
discretion when it imposed sanctions. Angelico, however, 
has standing to assert his antitrust claims, and we will 
remand the cause for further proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In addition, the District Court made additional findings of bad faith. 
In choosing not to sanction Appellant for this other conduct, the court 
doubtless took into account that it was already sanctioning him for the 
antitrust claims. 
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